Investigating the Complexity of Transitioning Separation Assurance Tools into NextGen Air Traffic Control by Morey, Susan et al.
INVESTIGATING THE COMPLEXITY OF TRANSITIONING SEPARATION 
ASSURANCE TOOLS INTO NEXTGEN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
 
Ashley N. Gomez, Lynne Martin, Jeffrey Homola, Susan Morey, Christopher Cabrall, Joey Mercer 
San Jose State University/NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California 
Thomas Prevot 
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California  
 
Abstract  
In a study, that introduced ground-based 
separation assurance automation through a series of 
envisioned transitional phases of concept maturity, it 
was found that subjective responses to scales of 
workload, situation awareness, and acceptability in a 
post run questionnaire revealed as-predicted results 
for three of the four study conditions but not for the 
third, Moderate condition. The trend continued for 
losses of separation (LOS) where the number of LOS 
events were far greater than expected in the Moderate 
condition. To offer an account of why the Moderate 
condition was perceived to be more difficult to 
manage than predicted, researchers examined the 
increase in amount and complexity of traffic, increase 
in communication load, and increased complexities 
as a result of the simulation’s mix of aircraft 
equipage.  Further analysis compared the tools 
presented through the phases, finding that controllers 
took advantage of the informational properties of the 
tools presented but shied away from using their 
decision support capabilities. Taking into account 
similar findings from other studies, it is suggested 
that the Moderate condition represented the first step 
into a “shared control” environment, which requires 
the controller to use the automation as a decision 
making partner rather than just a provider of 
information. Viewed in this light, the combination of 
tools offered in the Moderate condition was reviewed 
and some tradeoffs that may offset the identified 
complexities were suggested. 
Introduction 
Introducing automation into a critical system 
(that cannot be taken “offline”) is a complex process, 
made more complicated when this system is not 
software alone but a dynamic and safety-critical 
human-automation system like Air Traffic 
Management (ATM).   Therefore, for the transition 
from current day Air Traffic Control (ATC) to a full 
Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) environment [1], not only is the end-point 
of concern but also the transitional phases, where 
automation is being first introduced.  For example, in 
transitional phases it is likely that aircraft equipage 
will vary, and while some controller tools are 
available, not all planned features and functions will 
be accessible.  The human-automation interaction in 
these phases is of concern. There is a requirement for 
the tools in transitional phases to assist controllers 
with managing the predicted increase in air traffic 
demand [2] without any degradation in the 
performance of the system relative to the high bar set 
by current day operations.   
Current day Air Traffic Control relies heavily on 
a human operator possessing the skills and cognitive 
resources to manage the traffic in their sector.  This is 
true at a broad level but also for specific ATC 
functions, for example, the controller is responsible 
for nearly all separation-related tasks. If the 
separation assurance function is viewed as a human 
supervisory control system [3], then current day ATC 
could be deemed to function at an automation level of 
1 [4], that is: “the computer offers no assistance: 
human must take all decisions and actions” (p287, 
Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000, [5]).  
Although the controller has an enhanced radar 
display, it provides information to enable controller 
situation awareness rather than decision support 
(advice about what action to take).  
The Concepts and Technology Development 
Project of the NASA Airspace Systems Program is 
exploring fundamental changes to the separation 
assurance process [6].  It will take advantage of 
advances in automation to allocate many separation 
assurance tasks to ground-based automation, freeing 
the controller to manage their traffic and oversee the 
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aircraft separation function.  Fully operational, and 
after full implementation, such a system would 
“execute automatically, then necessarily inform 
humans” (p287, Parasuraman, et al., 2000 [5]) for 
routine separation tasks, which is an automation level 
of 7 in Sheridan and Verplank’s [4] distinction of 
levels of automation.  
Endsley and Kaber [7] explored different levels 
of automation (LOA) based on a taxonomy they 
developed from the work of Sheridan and Verplank.  
They found that the LOA significantly impacted task 
performance in a radar monitoring task in ways that 
were sometimes positive and sometimes negative, 
often varying with LOA, e.g., a level 7 
implementation produced slightly better performance 
than a level 8 instantiation [7]. They also suggested 
participants became distracted under mid-to-low 
levels of automation. Endsley and Kabers’ findings, 
and those of others (e.g., [8]), suggest that the impact 
on task performance of the particular combination of 
function allocation to both human and automation 
under different phases of implementation (different 
LOA) needs to be examined.   
While some systems can be implemented in an 
all-at-once fashion, advancing the level of 
supervisory control from 1 or 2 to 7 or beyond in one 
step, larger systems are likely to be implemented in 
phases for numerous practical reasons.  However, if 
there is a choice, selecting which tools should be 
introduced in early phases and which should be 
reserved for more advanced stages is a problem in 
itself [9], as it is possible that some combinations of 
tools may work better together than others.   
The separation assurance concept, employed in 
this study, was developed from the Advanced 
Airspace Concept (AAC) proposed by Erzberger 
[10].  It comprises three ground-based elements: the 
Automated Airspace Computer System (AACS), the 
Tactical Separation Assisted Flight Environment 
(TSAFE) and a controller interface.  
A human-in-the-loop separation assurance study 
was conducted that focused on human performance 
when automated tools were combined into ATC 
operations [6]. Researchers observed whether 
controllers could accommodate higher levels of 
demand in the en route airspace (i.e., more traffic) 
with no reduction in current levels of safety and no 
increase in Air Traffic Controller load.  The study 
reported the impact on human performance and 
safety as it was tested through four potential phases 
of implementation, beginning with the current day 
ATC system as a baseline, through two transitional 
phases, to a full-implementation “Maximum” phase, 
where ground-based automation performed the 
separation task from detection to resolution for all 
aircraft without direct operator involvement [6]. Each 
of the phases were characterized not only by 
differences in the level of automation available but 
also by different levels of aircraft equipage and data 
communications.  This paper will delve into human 
interactions with the automation system and 
investigate how certain combinations of tools 
affected performance of ATC duties, with specific 
focus on the third phase of implementation where the 
impact of the level of automation was unexpected. 
Operational Environment/ Procedures 
Study Conditions 
The four study conditions were chosen to 
represent a baseline Current Day phase and three 
envisioned future phases of implementation of a 
ground-based separation assurance concept based on 
the AAC [10].  Implementing the concept made two 
significant changes to the ATC environment.  The 
most obvious was the addition of conflict resolution 
tools on the controller workstations.  However, the 
second, and possibly more significant change, was to 
the controllers’ responsibilities.  That is, the ATC 
environment developed into an ATM environment 
where the controller moved from being responsible 
for safe separation to being responsible for general 
oversight and system exceptions (Table 1).  
Additionally, study conditions were varied by the 
level of aircraft equipage – the number of aircraft 
with Data Comm capabilities (TFR) – and 
environmentally – in the amount of traffic in the 
scenario – so that the environmental complexity was 
commensurate with the LOA available to control it. 
Thus, the mixture of aircraft and the tools available in 
any given condition were designed to reflect 
transitional environments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Study Conditions and Variables 
  
Current 
Day 
Minimum Moderate Maximum 
Traffic level 
vs. Today’s 
Same as 
today 
1.2x  1.5x ~2.0x 
Data Comm 
equipage 
0% ~25% ~50% 100% 
Controller’s 
responsibility 
Safe 
separation 
Safe 
separation 
Safe 
separation 
System 
exceptions 
Ground 
automation’s 
responsibility 
Current day Current day 
Critical 
support 
role as 
conflict 
detection 
and 
resolution 
tool 
Conflict 
detection, 
strategic 
resolutions, 
tactical 
resolutions, 
exception 
alerting 
Ground 
automation 
tools 
Conflict 
probe, 
conflict list, 
pre-probed 
fly out 
altitude 
menu 
 
Conflict 
probe, 
conflict list, 
pre-probed 
fly out 
altitude 
menu, time 
to go in 
flight data 
block 
(FDB), 
lateral trial 
planner.  
 
Data 
Comm, 
auto top of 
climb 
(TOC), 
auto 
handoff 
(HO) for 
equipped 
aircraft 
Conflict 
probe, 
interactive 
conflict 
list, pre-
probed fly 
out altitude 
menu, time 
to go in 
FDB, 5th 
line 
conflict 
advisories, 
trial 
planner;   
 
Data 
Comm, 
auto TOC, 
auto HO, 
interactive 
auto 
resolver 
for 
equipped 
aircraft  
Conflict 
probe, 
interactive 
conflict list 
with auto 
resolver 
status info, 
FDB pre-
probed fly 
out altitude 
menu, auto 
TOC, auto 
HO, auto 
uplink auto 
resolver 
conflict 
resolutions, 
auto uplink 
of TSAFE 
advisories, 
post 
TSAFE 
auto back-
on-course 
auto 
uplink, 
turn 
TSAFE 
auto off & 
on 
Frequency 
changes 
Via voice 
Via voice 
or Data 
Comm 
Via voice 
or Data 
Comm 
Via Data 
Comm 
Trajectory 
changes 
Via voice Via voice Via voice 
or Data 
Comm 
Via voice 
or Data 
Comm 
Handoff 
behavior 
Manual 
initiate, 
manual 
accept 
Manual 
initiate & 
accept 
(IFR); auto 
initiate, 
auto accept 
(TFR) 
Manual 
initiate & 
accept 
(IFR); auto 
initiate, 
auto accept 
(TFR) 
Auto 
initiate, 
auto accept 
– all TFR  
 
 
Airspace 
The simulated airspace used for this study 
consisted of five adjacent, high-altitude, en route test 
sectors, constructed to represent Cleveland Center 
airspace (ZOB) (see Figure 1). The floor of the over-
all test airspace was set to flight level (FL) 330. One 
participant R-side controller and one supporting D-
side controller pair was assigned to each of the five 
test sectors. Confederate positions maintained the 
airspace surrounding the test area, both below FL 320 
and the surrounding FL 330 and above. 
 
Figure 1. Cleveland Center Test Airspace. The five 
sectors were divided up into north and south areas, 
identified here by color. 
Traffic 
The traffic scenarios used were based on actual 
traffic from the Cleveland Center area and each 
scenario was comprised of a mix of ZOB arrivals and 
departures to and from area airports with level 
overflights. As shown in Table 1, in the Current Day 
condition, traffic was set at today’s levels and sectors 
had a Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP) of 18. Traffic 
was increased from this level by 20% in the 
Minimum condition, 50% in the Moderate condition, 
and was nearly doubled in the Maximum condition 
(see figure 2).  As the traffic increased, the 
percentage of aircraft equipped with air-ground data 
communications capabilities also increased, from 
100% unequipped (IFR) traffic to all Data Comm 
equipped aircraft (TFR) (see figure 3).   
Through scenario design and the controller’s 
interaction with the system, a number of conflicts 
occurred that required some level of controller 
involvement. Conflicts were detected and displayed 
automatically to the controller; how they were 
displayed varied depending on the condition.  
 
Figure 2. Total Aircraft Count in the Simulation 
per Condition. Note that these are averages across 
all runs in a given condition. 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of Unequipped (IFR) & 
Equipped (TFR) Aircraft in the Traffic Scenarios 
for the Four NextGen Study Conditions 
Apparatus 
 The simulation platform used for this study 
was the Multi Aircraft Control System (MACS) [11], 
a software platform developed in the Airspace 
Operations Laboratory (AOL) that has a wide range 
of simulation and rapid prototyping capabilities. Each 
controller workstation was equipped with a Barco 
display and data system replacement (DSR) trackball 
and keyboard. Voice communications were 
conducted through a custom, stand-alone voice 
system with a dedicated server.  
Participants 
 Seven individuals served as test participants 
for this study. Five were radar controllers (R-side), 
and two served as supervisors.  Test participants were 
current or recently retired. Additionally, five retired 
controllers served as radar associate (D-side) 
positions in support of the test participants, and three 
as confederate “ghost” controllers responsible for the 
traffic outside the test airspace. Ten airline pilots 
operated eight mid-fidelity, single-aircraft flight 
simulators (referred to as ASTORs), and ten general 
aviation/corporate pilots operated multi-aircraft 
stations. 
Procedures 
The study was run over a total of eight days, 
with two consecutive days paired for a given 
condition. The first day in each pair was spent 
training for the condition of interest and the second 
day was spent collecting data by way of six study 
runs for that condition.  The first two days focused on 
the Current Day condition, the second two days on 
the Minimum condition, the third two days on the 
Moderate condition, and the last two days tested the 
Maximum condition.  Thus, a total of 24 data 
collection runs were completed across the four 
conditions. 
Each of the 24 runs was 40 minutes in length 
with the traffic building up gradually to be at its peak 
by the midpoint of the run. The North and South 
areas (Figure 1) were housed in physically separate 
rooms, each with an assigned area supervisor who 
monitored the traffic situation as well as the 
workload of the participant radar controllers. It was 
up to the supervisor to judge whether/when D-side 
support was needed.  
For most conditions, the R-side controllers were 
responsible for the safe separation of traffic, although 
in the Maximum condition their task was to oversee 
the automation and manage traffic by exception. 
Their other tasks, such as traffic hand-offs and 
managing local arrivals and departures were also 
affected by the level of automation available (see 
Table 1). In the Current Day condition they had to 
complete these tasks manually but by the Maximum 
condition they oversaw the automation as it 
completed these tasks. 
 The automation’s role changed through the four 
conditions of the study.  In the Current Day 
condition, it detected conflicts and alerted the 
controllers who then had to solve the problems 
themselves (Table 1). In the Minimum condition, the 
automation offered more information about the 
conflicts and provided resolutions along the lateral 
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dimension. By the Moderate condition, the 
automation found resolutions to strategic conflicts, 
but controllers had to send the resolution to the TFR 
aircraft, which was their opportunity to review it.  In 
the Maximum condition, the automation solved both 
tactical and strategic conflicts autonomously, 
informing the controller through a status panel on the 
display.  The controller could intervene at any point, 
especially in tactical conflicts, and take over the 
problem if they desired. 
 Thus, the eventual endpoint in our four phase 
transition into NextGen (being the Maximum 
condition) would allow for a shift in controllers’ 
responsibilities to a more exception-based role. The 
controller was alerted to conflicts and resolutions that 
fell outside of the pre-defined thresholds. Once the 
controller took control of a conflict it became his/her 
responsibility until s/he “released” the aircraft pair 
back to the automation using a keyboard command. 
Tools 
For this paper, there is a focus on the variability 
in the LOA of tools available to the controllers and 
how the tools were used in the context of the 
condition. The tools provided were either 
informational tools, decision support tools (DSTs), or 
supervisory control systems, as defined by [7]. The 
chief difference between these tools is their function, 
but this is characterized by the way they display 
information, their part in the decision process of an 
action to be taken and the implementation of that 
action, and whether they alter the controller’s role in 
ATM. Our working definition of an information tool 
is one where a computer-based system provides 
information about a situation that is likely to require 
an action but identification, selection and execution 
of the action is the controller’s responsibility. Here, 
the decision support tools generate a single 
resolution, usually represented as the best option 
given the circumstances, which provides a decision-
action option and again, it is the controller’s decision 
to select the action. However with DSTs, once an 
option is selected, it is turned over to the 
computer/automation to implement. In our 
“supervisory system”, automation plays a larger role 
by generating options, selecting the option to 
implement, and carrying out that action. The 
controller mainly monitors the system and intervenes 
if necessary.    
Depending on the condition, controllers had 
access to the various tools, but were not required to 
use them (refer to table 1). In the Current Day 
condition, controllers had three information tools 
available to assist them with separation assurance – 
the conflict probe, conflict list, and pre-probed 
altitude flyout menu.  In the Minimum condition, 
controllers had the same information tools as in the 
Current Day condition, with the addition of time to 
go in the flight data block (FDB), and a lateral trial 
planner in addition to the vertical flyout menu. And 
with the addition of equipped aircraft, data comm, 
auto top of climb (TOC), auto handoff (HO) were 
also available for equipped aircraft. In the Moderate 
condition, all of the same informational tools were 
available with more interactive capabilities; however 
two DSTs were added with the 5th line advisories for 
all conflicting aircraft and an interactive strategic 
auto resolver for equipped aircraft. Again Data 
Comm, auto TOC, and auto HO were available for 
equipped aircraft (see figure 4 below).   
 
Figure 4. Example of Controller Tools from 
the Moderate Condition 
With the advancement of the conditions 
explained thus far, the separation assurance tools 
increased in number and capability, but it was still 
Delay in DB Conflict Time 
 in DB 
Trial Planning Tools 
Interactive Conflict List 
Conflict Probe 
Altitude 
Fly out 
Menu 
Trial 
Plan 
Data 
Comm 
Uplink 
Window 
5th Line 
Advisories 
the responsibility of the controller to decide on and 
implement a particular action. In the Maximum 
condition, was the first instance of a supervisory 
system, where the automation detected conflicts, 
computed resolutions, selected a resolution, and 
implemented the resolution for both short term 
(tactical/TSAFE) and long term (strategic) conflicts 
by automatic uplink to the aircraft.  Controllers 
monitored clearances issued by the automation 
through a status window, and were alerted to 
conflicts and resolutions that fell outside of the pre-
defined thresholds, and intervened to solve the 
conflicts that the automation could not. 
Data Collected 
Non-voice data communications as well as both 
periodic and event driven data were collected via 
MACS’ internal collection capabilities and were 
supplemented through audio-video screen capture 
software. At the end of each run, participants 
completed a questionnaire that asked for their 
opinions about different aspects of the run, including 
their perceived workload, situation awareness and the 
acceptability of the automation configuration for the 
run.   
Results  
Human Performance Findings 
The results below are presented in two sections; 
firstly, a set of (predominantly subjective) human and 
system performance findings, and a second set that 
explores how and why the participants used the 
automation available (the “tools”).  In both sections, 
while results are presented for all four study 
conditions, the focus is on the Moderate condition 
findings and where they were, or were not, in line 
with our predictions for these data specifically, and 
the study aims in general.  The study aims were that 
performance in future conditions would equal or 
exceed Current Day performance.  The predictions 
for our specific analysis reported below were that 
perceived operator load would gradually reduce 
across the four conditions from the current day to the 
far future.   The remainder of this paper will explore 
this prediction. 
Workload Ratings 
The NASA Task Load Index (TLX), a measure 
of perceived workload, was developed by Hart & 
Staveland [12] and is comprised of six subscales.  In 
the present study, four of these subscales were asked 
in the post run questionnaire where participants 
responded on a 1 to 7 scale (“very low” to “very 
high”) to the level of time pressure, effort, mental 
demand, and frustration they felt.  A mean was 
calculated for each subscale across the six runs in 
each condition, and these are depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Mean Controller Ratings for NASA 
TLX Subscales 
On all four TLX subscales, participants reported 
the highest mean load in the Current Day condition.  
Mental demand, time pressure and effort were all 
reported to be “moderate” (around 4) and there was 
“some” frustration (m=2.81).  For the Minimum 
condition, mean load is slightly lower on all four sub 
scales, not by much, in general a half-scale point, but 
there is a trend.  Looking to the Maximum condition, 
mean load is much lower on all four scales – with the 
mean rating being “low” or “very low” reflecting the 
change in the controllers’ role in this condition.   
Our prediction was that workload would 
decrease from the Current Day across levels of 
automation, with workload reducing to its lowest in 
the far future (Maximum) condition.  Workload 
across the study followed this pattern in general but 
the mean workload for the Moderate condition was 
higher than for the Minimum condition, contrary to 
our prediction, and instead, on average, reported 
loads close to Current Day levels.    
Situation Awareness Ratings (SART) 
A second subjective measure obtained through 
self-report was the Situation Awareness Rating 
Technique (SART), which was developed by Taylor 
& Selcon [13] and has three subscales.  Again, 
participants responded from 1 to 7 on each sub-scale 
(“very low” to “very high”) to give their estimation 
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of their situational Understanding, their Capacity to 
take in more information and the Demand on their 
attention.   The SART score was calculated from 
these ratings, producing an overall score from -5 to 
13 for each participant, and then a mean for each 
condition was obtained, shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Mean SART Scores Given by 
Controllers 
Overall, mean situation awareness showed an 
increasing trend from the Current Day (4.87, 
“moderate awareness”) to the Minimum condition 
(7.00) and on to the Maximum condition (10.93, 
“high awareness”).  The Minimum awareness scores 
were significantly greater than those in the Current 
Day (Z=2.639, n=29, p=.008) when tested using a 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. The exception to these 
results was a downward shift in the Moderate 
condition rating (m=5.6, “moderate awareness”), 
which is still slightly higher than awareness reported 
in the Current Day but not markedly higher, as 
predicted.  The difference between the Current Day 
and the Moderate condition was not significant.  
Our prediction was that situation awareness 
would increase from the Current Day to the 
Maximum condition, with awareness being at its 
highest in the far future (Maximum) where 
participants should feel the automation increased 
their Capacity over the Demand.  Situation awareness 
under three of the conditions followed our 
predictions, increasing with LOA, but for the 
Moderate condition it did not.  
Acceptability Ratings (CARS) 
A third subjective measure gathered through the 
questionnaire was the Controller Acceptance Rating 
Scale (CARS) [14] that uses a scale derived from the 
Cooper-Harper to assess controllers’ comfort level 
with a system. Participants work through a series of 
yes/ no questions to reach a three-point rating scale 
where they assess their acceptance of the system.  
These three-point scales can be combined into one 
ten-point scale to give a CARS score out of ten, see 
Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Mean Acceptability Ratings Given by 
Controllers 
As with the previous two scales, our prediction 
was that mean ratings on the CARS would increase 
from the Current Day to the Maximum condition.  
Although the increase is slight, from a mean rating of 
8.75 (Current Day) to 9 (Maximum), the trend is 
present for three of the four study conditions.  Again, 
the Moderate mean rating, of 6.75, does not follow 
the trend and is lower than predicted.  It is 
significantly lower than the CARS means for the 
three other conditions (e.g., the comparison with the 
Minimum condition values was significant at the 
p<.05 level: Z=2.375, n=10, p=.018), while the other 
three conditions were not significantly different 
between themselves. 
This trend, where data for the Moderate 
condition showed unexpected patterns when 
compared with the other three conditions in the study, 
is consistent with controller responses to other 
questionnaire items that the Moderate condition was 
more challenging than the Minimum or Maximum.  
However, there is not the space in this paper to cover 
these.  To ascertain whether the observed differences 
were solely in participant perception or whether there 
were performance effects, the instances of loss of 
separation (LOS) were reviewed.  LOS events were 
chosen as an objective measure because the focus of 
the automation enhancements was on supporting 
separation assurance. 
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Study Conditions 
Losses of Separation 
In the Current Day, Minimum and Moderate 
conditions, controllers were alerted to conflicts when 
they owned one or both aircraft, or if the loss of 
separation was predicted to occur within the 
controller’s airspace.    Aircraft had to meet specific 
proximity criteria to alert as a conflict, and these are 
discussed in detail in [15].  In the Maximum 
condition, controllers were only alerted to conflicts 
predicted to occur within their airspace – a different 
rule that reduced the number of conflicts controllers 
were alerted to.   
Across the four study conditions, there were 
2,323 conflicts detected by the automation, and some 
of these alerted to multiple controllers based on the 
rules above.   Figure 8 shows the 2,323 conflicts 
distributed across the four study conditions.   
 
CONFLICTS CD Min Mod Max 
Total 390 486 727 720 
Figure 8. Number of Detected Conflicts Across the 
Four Study Conditions 
The increase in alerted conflicts in the future 
conditions was expected, due to the increase in traffic 
level within the same area of airspace.  However, 
very few of these alerts developed into a loss of 
separation event.  A LOS was recorded any time two 
aircraft were simultaneously closer than 5 nautical 
miles (nmi) laterally and less than 800 feet apart 
vertically. To be included in the analysis, a LOS had 
to occur within one of the test sectors after the first 
five minutes of a run and last for more than twelve 
consecutive seconds (one full, simulated radar 
position update), see Cabrall [16] for more details. Of 
the 2,323 conflicts alerted, 48 developed into losses 
of separation (2%). After further analysis of these 48 
incidents, 23 were discounted as simulation artifacts, 
leaving 25.  Of these, 15 (or 60%) occurred in the 
Moderate condition (Figure 9).  Compared with the 
Maximum condition, which essentially had the same 
number of alerts (Figure 8) but far fewer LOS (Figure 
9), the disparity in the number of LOS in the 
Moderate condition is marked.  In terms of a 
percentage based on the alerts, there is an increase in 
the rate of LOS from 1.2% (Minimum) to 2.1% 
(Moderate).    A doubling of the rate of LOS may not 
seem a large increase but in terms of safety is 
considered a marked upswing in losses of separation.   
 
Figure 9. Losses of Separation Across the Four 
Study Conditions 
As for the predictions regarding the subjective 
data, the study predictions for the LOS were similar – 
that the Moderate LOS rate would fall somewhere 
between the Minimum and Maximum rates.  Figure 9 
shows that this was not the case.  It is likely that the 
subjective results discussed above are linked both 
directly and indirectly to the LOS observed.  That is, 
a greater number of LOS are likely to directly affect a 
controller’s system acceptability rating and indirectly 
affect a controller’s rating of their situation 
awareness and workload. The way traffic scenarios 
were increased across the phases increased the traffic 
complexity as well as the demand. The controller 
experience measures suggest that managing the 
traffic demand in the Moderate condition with DST 
did not follow the predicted trend that controllers 
should find the situations easier to manage than the 
Minimum condition.  
However, although it is straightforward to 
suggest a link between the subjective and objective 
results, none of the data discussed to this point in the 
paper offers an account to explain or describe why 
the Moderate condition was perceived to be harder to 
manage than the Minimum condition and only just a 
little easier than the Current Day.  The remainder of 
this paper will delve into other data to identify 
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potential factors that could have made the Moderate 
condition more difficult to manage than expected.   
Exploring the Moderate Condition 
Findings 
Increased Complexity 
There are a number of possible accounts for the 
irregular pattern of controller experience results in 
the Moderate condition.  Possibly the most simple 
reason might be the increase in traffic.  All categories 
of traffic were increased: overflights, arrivals and 
departures. Because of this, each test sector was more 
densely packed and this increased the chances for 
conflicts (as seen in Figure 8 above).  It can be 
suggested that the increase in traffic level in these 
conditions resulted in more events and situations and 
this increased demand on the controllers.  
Specifically, the increased traffic became more 
complex rather than just more numerous, which 
possibly made individual situations harder to solve. 
Increasing the traffic levels with each condition 
meant that there was an increase in the number of 
aircraft coming in and out of each sector, and some of 
the hardest conflicts to solve were those at the sector 
boundary, or with transitioning aircraft (Figure 11).  
Since the two transitional phases (with automation) 
still required some level of controller involvement, it 
is possible that the number and type of conflicts 
increased demand on operators’ cognitive resources, 
and this was not yet offset by the increased 
automation functions until the Maximum condition.  
A second effect of more traffic was an increase 
in perceived communication and coordination load. 
Figure 10 below shows the controller’s mean 
reported level of both voice communication and Data 
Comm load across the study conditions. These 
measures were subjective, and point at the number of 
controller resources that were devoted to managing 
both types of communication. The controller’s level 
of perceived voice load was fairly consistent between 
Current Day (m=3.9), Minimum (m=3.8), and 
Moderate conditions (m=3.6). This itself would not 
be interesting, but in both the Minimum and 
Moderate conditions, controllers’ perceived Data 
Comm load (m=3) was similar to the voice load.  
 
Figure 10. Controllers Perceived Level of 
Communication/Coordination Load 
Taken together, the perceived communication 
operations in the Minimum and Moderate conditions 
were greater than those found in the Current Day or 
Maximum conditions. And although Data Comm was 
introduced in the Minimum condition as a means to 
reduce the voice load, it can be observed that its 
functional implementation still required a large 
degree of controller involvement, thus Data Comm 
may have added to, rather than offset, the overall 
higher communication demand in these future 
conditions. 
Alongside this notion, controllers also 
identified which operations required the most 
coordination (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11. Controllers’ Opinions of Operations 
that Required the Most Coordination, as a 
Percentage. Note that controllers could mark 
multiple categories.  
Figure 11 shows that both boundary conflicts and 
conflicts caused by aircraft changing altitudes were 
marked as requiring the high levels of coordination. 
With the increase in traffic across the study 
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conditions, the volume of these two types of conflicts 
also increased and the corresponding coordination 
load that came with them was not offset by the tools 
as was intended.  Instead, it is likely that these 
conflicts increased task demands on controllers. 
A third impact on demand could have been the 
mix of aircraft equipage.  As the conditions 
advanced, not only did the overall total number of 
aircraft increase, but the ratio of TFR (equipped) to 
IFR (unequipped) aircraft also increased. As seen in 
Figure 12, the majority of conflicts detected were 
between IFR-TFR pairs. With the variation in display 
and procedures between aircraft equipage levels, it 
could have been difficult for controllers to establish a 
strategy for resolving mixed equipage conflicts; and 
with limitations to the time and effort that can be 
spent on any given task, it could be the case that the 
added complexity of the transitional phases was not 
proportional to the aid provided by the tools 
available. 
 
Figure 12. The Composition of Conflict Pairs by 
Flight Rule in the Moderate Condition 
With the intention of providing controllers with 
tools that were meant to offset the increased demands 
of a given condition, researchers took a closer look at 
how controllers used the tools as they developed 
across the study conditions. 
Tool Use/Preference 
After each run, controllers indicated which tools 
they had used from the set of tools available for that 
condition. Figure 13 shows the way reported tool 
usage varied across the four study conditions.  (Note 
that only the conflict list and conflict probe were 
available in all four conditions.) To summarize, most 
informational tools were reported to be used most of 
the time.  For example, R-side controllers reported 
using the conflict probe 80% of the time or more. 
One informational tool used slightly less often was 
the conflict list.  It provided information, but its use 
declined from 75% in the Current Day to 60% in the 
Maximum condition. However, controllers reported 
using the updated interactive conflict list more in the 
Moderate condition than any other condition.  The  
DSTs that were introduced from the Moderate 
condition onward had varying levels of popularity.  
Controllers reported using the auto-resolver for 
strategic conflicts 80% of the time or more, and the 
auto-uplinking T-SAFE resolution 75% of the time in 
the Maximum condition, although the short-term 
resolution suggestion in fifth line of the FDB was the 
least popular DST. 
 
Figure 13. Tools Used by Controllers Across the 
Four Study Conditions 
Controllers tended to use the informational tools 
– conflict probe, conflict list, time to go in FDB, and 
trial planning – across all the conditions but there 
were indications they shied away from using the 
more automated DSTs where partial controller 
involvement was required (such as the 5
th
 line in the 
FDB).  Evidence (of the way controllers used the 
DSTs) suggests they were not used to their full 
advantage as decision support tools.  That is, 
controllers referred to and used the information 
provided by the DSTs, but did not relinquish decision 
making or responsibility of implementation to the 
automation. As evidence, in the Moderate condition, 
although all of the conflicts were alerted to the 
controllers, the auto-resolver was only invoked 22% 
of the time, and in those instances where it was 
invoked, controllers rejected the solution 54% of the 
time [15]. This reiterates that controllers tended to 
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use the more automated tools as informational 
resources rather than decision support. 
 A possible reason for why controllers did not 
use the tools as intended could have been a mismatch 
in the developmental stage of the tool and the task 
demands of the condition. To delve a little deeper 
into this idea, researchers asked controllers to rank 
the tool variations by “usefulness in aiding their 
simulation tasks.” Three groups of tools were 
selected – short term conflict tools, strategic conflict 
and planning tools, and conflict information tools – 
and controllers ranked the list of tools within each 
category.  
For the short-term conflict tools, participants 
ranked the Maximum condition auto-uplink TSAFE 
with the back-on-course features as their top choice 
(the most useful) over the “stripped-down” versions 
of the tool presented in earlier conditions (Table 2).  
However, they did not rank the tools’ usefulness in 
descending order of their functionality, after the 
Maximum condition short term conflict tool, they 
ranked the Current Day, when they had no tools, as 
their second preference.  Importantly, it seems 
participants preferred all-or-nothing for short term 
conflict assistance. 
Table 2.  Participants’ Rank Ordering of 
Usefulness of the Short Term Conflict Tools 
Rank 
Order 
NextGen 
Levels 
Short Term Conflict Tools 
1 Maximum 
Auto-uplink of T-SAFE 
advisories plus post-T-SAFE 
auto back-on-course auto-
uplink 
2 
Current 
Day, 
Minimum 
Solving short term conflicts 
manually  
3 Moderate 
Conflict vector advisories in 
the 5th line of the flight data 
block 
For the strategic conflict and planning tools, 
controllers ranked the Moderate interactive auto-
resolver tool with the manual data link feature as the 
most useful over the more advanced version of the 
tool presented in the Maximum condition (Table 3).  
However, the Maximum tool was their second 
preference and the Current Day option of no tools 
was ranked least useful.  Participants preferred 
having tools to assist them with strategic conflicts. 
Table 3.  Participants’ Rank Ordering of 
Usefulness of the Strategic Conflict and Planning 
Tools 
Rank 
Order 
NextGen 
Levels 
Strategic Conflict & 
Planning Tools 
1 Moderate 
Interactive auto-resolver with 
manual data comm uplink 
2 Maximum 
Auto-uplink of within-limits 
strategic resolutions by an 
auto conflict resolver  
3 Minimum 
Manual trial planning tools 
(vertical and lateral) via voice 
4 
Current 
Day 
No trial planning tools 
For conflict information tools, participants 
ranked the Minimum conflict list, with the time to go 
in the FDB feature, as the most useful over the more 
advanced versions of the list presented in later 
conditions (Table 4).  However, continuation of the 
ranking shows a preference for the more advanced 
tools, with controllers ranking the auto-resolver status 
list as their second preference, over the basic conflict 
list, which was ranked least useful. Other analyses 
support these subjective rankings; see Homola, et al. 
[15]. 
Table 4.  Participants’ Rank Ordering of 
Usefulness of the Conflict Information Tools 
Rank 
Order 
NextGen 
Levels 
Conflict Information Tools 
1 Minimum 
Conflict list with time-to-go in 
the flight data block 
2 Maximum 
Auto-resolver status 
information included in the 
interactive conflict list  
3 Moderate 
Interactive conflict list with 
auto-resolve on request 
4 
Current 
Day 
Basic conflict list 
Overall, tools in the Maximum condition 
received the highest usefulness rankings, and those in 
the Current Day received the lowest rankings.  
However, Minimum tools received higher rankings 
than Moderate tools overall.  This may shed some 
light on the subjective performance data discussed 
above, which suggested that the Moderate condition 
was more difficult to manage, as these tool ranking 
reports suggest the controllers found the tools in the 
Moderate condition less useful – slightly above that 
of the Current Day. A reasonable explanation for 
such results might be that perceptions of tool 
accuracy and controller confidence in those tools 
suffered and so are examined in the next section. 
Tool Accuracy 
In general, questionnaire responses indicate that 
tools were not perceived to be less accurate in the 
Moderate condition.  Controllers were asked to rate 
the accuracy of the conflict list, auto resolver, and 
TSAFE advisories on a scale from 1 to 7 (from “very 
inaccurate” to “very accurate”). Controllers thought 
the conflict list was “quite accurate” in the Current 
Day (m=5.42) and Minimum (m=5.25) conditions.  
Their opinion did not change in the Moderate 
condition where they still felt the conflict list was 
“quite accurate” (m=5.58).  They also felt the auto-
resolver (a DST) was “quite accurate” (m=5.53).  
However, the fifth line advisories in the FDB were 
rated less positively as only “somewhat accurate” 
(m=4.33).  In the Maximum condition, controller 
opinions improved slightly, as they rated the T-SAFE 
resolutions as “quite accurate” (m=4.8).  
Tool Confidence 
Controllers also rated their confidence in the 
trial planning tools and strategic conflict advisories, 
again on a scale from 1 to 7 (from “not at all 
confident” to “very confident”).  Controllers’ 
confidence grew in the trial planning tools as they 
used them.  They were “quite confident” when they 
used the trial planner in the Minimum condition 
(m=5.2) but this confidence increased to “very 
confident” in the Maximum condition (m=6.5).   
Their confidence grew in a similar way when using 
the strategic conflict advisories: controllers were 
“quite confident” when they used the strategic 
advisories in the Moderate condition (m=5.5) and this 
confidence increased to “confident” in the Maximum 
condition (m=6.1). 
As controller confidence was reasonably high 
and the tools had positive perceived accuracy, it 
suggests that the reasons for low tool use were not 
that the controllers thought they worked incorrectly.  
Discussion 
In the Moderate condition, participants were 
introduced to two tools that provided a level of 
decision support, in addition to informational tools.  
While they felt confident in one of these DSTs and 
that it was accurate overall (the interactive auto-
resolver for equipped aircraft) they did not rank the 
Moderate toolset as more useful than the Minimum 
toolset.  Other controller self-reports supported that 
they found the Moderate toolset less useful than the 
Minimum toolset through generally increased 
workload and reduced situation awareness, and the 
recorded rate of LOS events nearly doubled. Taken as 
a whole, results suggested that controllers may not 
have drawn on tools’ decision support capabilities as 
much as they could and continued to use even DSTs 
as sources of information only.  It begs the question 
of why the more automated tools did not aid the 
controllers to the same degree as the informational 
tools.  
The Moderate condition tools were advanced 
logically from the Minimum condition: the conflict 
list became interactive and two DSTs were 
introduced.  This raised the level of automation of the 
tools to around a level 4 [4], which Endsley & Kaber 
[7] describe as “shared control”.  Under shared 
control, the human and the automation share the task 
of generating solutions in addition to sharing 
monitoring and implementing tasks. Looking back to 
Sheridan & Verplank’s levels of automation [4], we 
can see that controllers tended to prefer tools on 
either end of the spectrum: those that were more 
basic and involved little computer assistance, or those 
that were fully autonomous and required little 
controller interaction. Those iterations of tools that 
provided more informational resources – with little to 
no computer involvement in decision making 
appeared to be preferred over their more automated 
counterparts.  However, when tools that moved 
controllers to a supervisory role were introduced, 
they were able to use these tools  – and even reported 
a preference for some of them (Table 2).  This 
suggests that in the Moderate condition, controllers 
may have tried to maintain a “current day” approach 
or strategy to using the tools and did not modify their 
approach to a “Moderate strategy” that took 
advantage of the tools’ capabilities. 
Using lower “LOA strategies” in a higher LOA 
environment may have increased load for the 
controllers in a second way, in that the DSTs added 
another task for the controllers – to monitor what the 
automation was doing, so now the controller was still 
generating a resolution idea (for an increased number 
of alerts) plus they were monitoring the automation.  
So, the tools offered a raised LOA and ensured the 
controllers were informed but they did not support 
them in terms of reducing their tasks.  Kaber and 
Endsley [17] in a follow-on study to [7] obtained 
similar findings: that intermediate levels of 
automation were related to lower performance.   
Taking the suggestion that controller strategies 
did not advance at the same rate as the LOA in the 
study conditions, there is still the question of why 
controllers preferred information-only tools when 
more automated tools were available.  One 
explanation is that informational tools, like the 
conflict list, were used more frequently because, 
firstly, the controllers were familiar with these tools 
having used or seen versions of them at Center 
facilities.  Secondly, they had more time to train with 
them as the Current Day tools carried over through 
all four conditions. Thirdly, the variations in the 
tools’ capabilities were not so drastic from condition 
to condition to have to re-learn how to use them. All 
of these factors meant controllers were more familiar 
with the informational tools’ functions, thus allowing 
them to more fully integrate the tools into their 
accustomed strategies.  
 The DSTs introduced in the Moderate 
condition had increased functionality and allowed for 
controller interaction, but to use them to their full 
extent there was a learning curve. And because these 
tools were introduced later in the study, there was 
both less training with, and less exposure to them. It 
could be the case that controllers were unable to use 
the tools as intended (to compensate for the increase 
in demands for the given condition), which may also 
explain why the controllers used these tools as 
informational resources rather than for decision 
support as they were intended. 
Although traffic increased to 1.5 times the 
baseline (with 50% TFR) in the Moderate condition, 
which increased demand (and possibly complexity) 
of the problems, if a different combination of 
decision support tools had been available in the 
Moderate condition, participants may have found it 
easier to manage.  Following this line of questioning, 
if the Moderate tools did not support controllers in 
the way they needed, what properties could have 
been changed to make them more useful? 
As noted above, in the present study these 
considerations are speculative, as all the separation 
assurance tools that were introduced were new for the 
participants.  It is impossible to know whether 
additional training alone would have reduced the 
reports of higher demand in the Moderate condition 
as DSTs were introduced.  Even if this is the case, 
some improvements to the method and time of 
introducing this LOA may ease the process.  For 
example, if this level of tools is introduced earlier in 
time, when traffic demand is at 1.3 or 1.4 times 
current day levels, this may help the controllers by 
giving them time to become familiar with the 
automation before they truly need it.  A second 
facilitator may be to focus on a part of the automation 
and introduce that more fully.  The Moderate 
condition introduced an interactive resolver for 
strategic conflicts and a close-in alerting tool, both 
had value but neither reduced operator load.  For the 
Maximum condition, both of these tools were 
automated, reducing load for both types of conflict.  
What if the strategic auto resolver had been 
introduced in two modes in the Moderate condition, 
where conflicts meeting some criteria were 
automatically solved and others could be requested? 
As a trade-off close-in conflict alerting and resolution 
could have been reserved until the Maximum 
condition.  This would have provided the same 
number of tools in the Moderate condition but may 
have reduced its taskload.   
A third possible way to ease the introduction of 
shared control may be to look outside the focus 
automation (of the separation assurance tools) to the 
other sources of increased equipage.  In this study 
Data Comm was also automation that may have been 
a greater benefit to controllers if it had been advanced 
further in the Moderate condition.  For example, if 
75% of the traffic had been Data Comm equipped, 
rather than 50%, then an additional 25% of the 
aircraft would have had automatic handoffs and 
transfers of communication. This could result in a 
reduction in housekeeping taskload. 
Conclusion 
The present study considered separation 
assurance LOA through transitional phases of 
development, between current day ATC and fully 
implemented separation assurance ATM.  The way 
traffic scenarios were increased across the phases 
increased the traffic complexity as well as the 
demand.  Subjective reports from participants 
indicated they found the transitional phase that 
presented “shared control” [7], where some tools 
offered decision support, harder to manage than 
earlier and later study phases.  The “Moderate tools” 
did not offset the increased complexity of the 
condition.  The nature of shared control may have 
served to increase controllers’ monitoring duties, but 
not reduce their implementation or decision making 
tasks. Three modifications to our approach to the 
shared control LOA phase would be to: introduce the 
technology earlier to give a longer training period; 
make the LOA of each tool lower or higher on a case-
by-case basis to avoid shared control tools; and, 
ensure an increase in aircraft equipage. 
Taking a wider view, our initial findings would 
suggest that, as automation is introduced, 
consideration should be given to the taskload that 
semi-automated tools will add to an operator’s load.  
If one kind of task is removed (e.g., decision making) 
but a different kind is added (e.g., monitoring 
automation) the result could be a reduction in 
performance. With this in mind, presenting 
combinations of tools that are automated enough to 
reduce operator load by at least as much as they add 
may assist with decisions about which tools should 
be implemented in interim phases that introduce 
automation to a system.  
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